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Abstract
Until recently, cyber-physical systems, especially those
with safety-critical properties that manage critical in-
frastructure (e.g. power generation plants, water treat-
ment facilities, etc.) were considered to be invulnerable
against software security breaches. The recently discovered
‘W32.Stuxnet’ worm has drastically changed this percep-
tion by demonstrating that such systems are susceptible to
external attacks. Here we present an architecture that en-
hances the security of safety-critical cyber-physical systems
despite the presence of such malware. Our architecture uses
the property that control systems have deterministic execu-
tion behavior, to detect an intrusion within 0.6 µs while still
guaranteeing the safety of the plant. We also show that even
if an attack is successful, the overall state of the physical
system will still remain safe. Even if the operating system’s
administrative privileges have been compromised, our ar-
chitecture will still be able to protect the physical system
from coming to harm.
1. Introduction
Many systems that have safety-critical requirements
such as power plants, industry automation systems, automo-
biles, etc. can be classified as cyber-physical systems (CPS)
– i.e. a tight combination of, and co-ordination between,
computational and physical components. Typically the ‘cy-
ber’ side aids in the monitoring or control of the physical
side. These systems (or parts of them) have stringent safety
requirements and require deterministic operational guaran-
tees since a failure to meet either could result in physical
harm to the system, the environment or even humans.
Such systems have traditionally been considered to be
extremely secure since they (a) are typically not connected
to the Internet; (b) use specialized protocols and proprietary
interfaces (‘security through obscurity’) (c) are physically
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inaccessible to the outside world and (d) typically have their
control code executing on custom hardware such as special-
ized processors or programmable logic controllers (PLCs).
This misconception of ironclad security in such systems,
however, has recently been exposed when the ‘W32.Stuxnet’
worm (henceforth referred to as just ‘Stuxnet’) targeted
and successfully infiltrated a Siemens WinCC/PCS7 control
system [29–31]. Not only was it able to bypass all the secu-
rity (digital as well as physical) techniques but it also repro-
grammed the PLC that controlled the main system. It modi-
fied the operating frequencies sent from the PLC thus caus-
ing physical damage to the system [28].
In this paper, we specifically address the problem of se-
curity for physical control systems. Compared to general-
purpose techniques, our work is different in that we focus
on domain-specific characteristics of these cyber-physical
systems and in particular, their deterministic real-time na-
ture. We introduce an overall system architecture where an
isolated and trusted hardware component is leveraged to en-
hance the security of the complete system. We present a
novel intrusion detection mechanism that monitors context-
specific side channels on the main CPU – in this particular
paper we use the deterministic execution time of the con-
trol system as the main side channel for this purpose 1
Program execution inherently includes variance due to
a variety of features, viz. complex control flow (branches,
unbounded loops, etc.), hardware features (caches, branch
predictors, bus contention, etc,), system effects (OS noise
compiler optimizations, network traffic, interrupts, etc.) and
so on. Attackers often use these characteristics and other
vulnerabilities in the system to their advantage. Existing
mechanisms [8, 13] work well in detecting and prevent-
ing problems, but either require custom configuration of
reconfigurable hardware for each type of checking mech-
anism [8] or enforce run-time monitoring and constraints
on access to data by fine-grained checks on what instruc-
tions/programs are allowed to access [13]. Either way, there
is a distinct need to know more details about the program
and data semantics. Typically good security involves one
or more of the following principles: (i) knowledge/use of
1 We elaborate on other potential side-channels in Sections 5.3 and 9.
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control semantics; (ii) details about program and data se-
mantics and checking mechanisms; (iii) hardware-enabled
trust/protection; (iv) externally monitor-able information
(e.g. real-time execution time profile in our case) and (v)
robustness/fault-tolerance mechanisms.
Hence, we present the Secure System Simplex Architec-
ture (S3A) to improve the security of cyber-physical sys-
tems that uses (i), (iii), (iv) and (v) from above as follows: a
combination of knowledge of high-level control flow, a se-
cure co-processor implemented on an FPGA 2, determinis-
tic execution time profiles and System Simplex [2,26]. S3A
detects intrusions that modify execution times by as low a
value as 0.6µs on our test control system. With S3A, we ex-
pand the definition of ‘correct system state’ to include not
just the physical state of the plant but also the cyber state,
i.e. the state of the computer/PLC that executes the con-
troller code. This type of security is hard for an attacker
to overcome by reverse engineering the code or the sys-
tem especially since it involves absolutely no changes to
the source code/binary. Even if an infection occurs and all
of the security mechanisms are side-stepped (such as gain-
ing access to the administrative privileges or the replication
of our benevolent side channels), the trusted hardware com-
ponent (secure co-processor) and the robust Simplex mech-
anism will still prevent the physical system from coming to
harm, even from threats such as Stuxnet.
It is important to note that S3A is a system-level solution
that can integrate multiple different solutions to achieve se-
curity and safety in this domain. While we picked some
mechanisms (execution time, Simplex, etc.), other good
concepts and architectures [8, 13] can also be integrated to
make the system that much more secure and robust.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
We present the Secure System Simplex Architecture (S3A)
where,
1. a trusted hardware component provides oversight over
an untrusted real-time embedded control platform.
This design provides a guarantee of plant safety in the
event of successful infections. Even if an attacker gains
administrative/root privileges she cannot inflict much
harm since S3A ensures that the overall system (espe-
cially the physical plant) will not be damaged.
2. we investigate and use of context-dependent side chan-
nels for intrusion detection. These side channels, mon-
itored by the trusted hardware component, qualita-
tively increase the difficulty faced by potential at-
tackers. Typically side-channel communication is used
to break security techniques but we use them to our
advantage in S3A. In this paper, we focus on side-
2 Can be a trusted processor/ASIC/unwritable FPGA in the final imple-
mentation
channels in the context of CPU-controlled real-time
embedded control systems.
3. we build and evaluate an S3A prototype for an in-
verted pendulum plant and discuss implementation ef-
forts and the construction of side channel detection
mechanism for execution time-based side channels us-
ing and FPGA in the role of the trusted hardware com-
ponent. The side channel approach is shown to detect
intrusions significantly faster than earlier plant-state-
only detection approaches.
While intrusion detection is a broad area in computer se-
curity, our approach takes advantage of the real-time prop-
erties specific to embedded control systems. Also, most of
the existing side-channel techniques/information (timing,
memory, etc.) have traditionally been used to break the se-
curity of systems. This paper, proposes a method to turn
it around so that these pieces of information are now used
for increasing the security of the system. Also, such tech-
niques have not been used before with the perspective of
safety-critical control systems – hence we believe that this
paper’s contributions are really novel.
We also believe that our approach is generalizable to
PLC and microcontroller-based CPS. Our justification is
twofold; such systems (i) have stringent requirements for
correct operation, i.e. the physical state of the plant must be
kept safe under all conditions and (ii) often require the con-
troller process to run in a deterministic manner.
Assumptions: The important assumptions for the work
presented in this paper are:
• the system consists of a set of periodic, real-time tasks
with stringent timing and deadline constraints man-
aged by a real-time scheduler; such systems typically
do not exhibit complex control flow, do not use dynam-
ically allocated data structures, do not contain loops
with unknown upper bounds, don’t use function point-
ers, etc. – in fact, they are often designed/developed
with simplicity and determinism in mind
• the hardware component must be trusted and can only
be accessed by authorized personnel/engineers – this is
not unlike the RSA encryption mechanism where the
person holding the private key must be trusted
• the systems we describe are rarely updated and defi-
nitely not in a remote fashion (unlike,say, mobile em-
bedded devices) – see Section 4 for details.
Note: Our techniques are not specific to attacks men-
tioned in Section 2 and tackles the broader class of secu-
rity breaches of controllers in safety-critical CPS.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews
breaches in safety-critical systems while Section 3 dis-
cusses the attack models that affect our work. Section 4
provides a background of System-Level Simplex. Section
2
5 presents the Secure System Simplex Architecture and im-
plementation details. Section 6 discusses the evaluation of
the system. Section 7 discusses the limitations of our ap-
proach. Finally, related work is reviewed in Section 8 and
Section 9 concludes the paper and also presents some ideas
for future work.
2. Motivation
Many control systems attached to critical infrastructure
systems have traditionally been assumed to be extremely
secure. The chief concern with such systems is related
to safety, i.e. to ensure that the plant’s operations remain
within a predefined safety envelope. “Security” was attained
by restricting external access to such systems – they were
typically not connected to the Internet and only a few peo-
ple were granted access to the computers that controlled the
systems. Also, since parts (or even all) of the control code
executed on dedicated hardware (PLCs for instance), they
were considered to be secure as well.
2.1. Stuxnet
The W32.Stuxnet worm attack [29–31] overturned all of
the above assumptions. It showed that industrial control sys-
tems could now be targeted by malicious code and that not
even hardware-based controllers were safe. Stuxnet em-
ployed a really sophisticated attack mechanism that took
control of the industrial automation system executing on a
PLC. It took control of the system and operated it accord-
ing to the attacker’s design. It was also able to hide these
changes from the designers/engineers who operate the sys-
tem. To achieve these results, Stuxnet utilized a large num-
ber of complex methods the most notable of which was the
first known PLC rootkit [9]. In fact, Stuxnet was present on
the infected systems for a long time before it was detected
– perhaps even a few months. Also, from all the informa-
tion that is available about the original attack, it seems that
the worm made its way to the original system through an in-
fected USB stick. In this section we will focus on the real
target of Stuxnet – the control code that manages the plants
and the implications of such an attack.
Stuxnet had the ability to (a) monitor blocks that were
exchanged between the PLC and computer, (b) infect the
PLC by replacing legitimate blocks with infected ones and
(c) hide the infection from designers. This results in the op-
erators being unaware of the infection, since the information
that they receive (supposedly from the PLC) shows every-
thing to be operating correctly. The PLCs are used to com-
municate with and control ‘frequency converter drives’ that
manage the frequency of a variety of motors. The malicious
code in the infected PLC affects the operational frequency
of these motors so that they now operate outside their safety
ranges. E.g., in one instance, the frequency of a motor was
set to 1410 Hz, then 2 Hz and then to 1604 Hz and the en-
tire sequence is repeated multiple times – the normal oper-
ating frequency for this motor is between 807 Hz and 1210
Hz [28]. Hence, in this instance, Stuxnet’s actions can re-
sult in real physical harm to the system.
Note: In this work, our focus is not on preventing the
original intrusion or providing mechanisms to safeguard the
Windows machines that were originally infected. We intend
to detect the infection of the control code (on a PLC in this
example, but could be any computer that runs it) and mainly
safeguard the physical system from coming to harm.
2.2. Automotive Attack Surfaces
Researchers from the University of Washington demon-
strated how a modern automobile’s safety can be compro-
mised by malicious attackers [6, 15]. They show how an at-
tacker is able to circumvent the rudimentary security pro-
tections in modern automobiles and infiltrate virtually any
electronic control unit (ECU) in the vehicle and compro-
mise safety-critical systems such as disabling the brakes,
stopping the engine, selectively braking individual wheels
on demand, etc. – all of this, while ignoring the driver’s in-
puts/actions. They were able to achieve this due to the vul-
nerabilities in the CAN bus protocols used in many modern
vehicles. The attackers also show how malicious code can
be embedded within the car’s telematics unit that will com-
pletely erase itself after causing the crash.
This example is important, since the authors showed that
the safety-critical components of the vehicle can easily be
targeted, thus putting at risk the humans in the car. One im-
portant facet to note is that the critical components that were
attacked, such as engine control unit, braking unit, etc. all
have stringent real-time properties. Hence, our techniques
will work well in detecting the intrusions in these safety-
critical subsystems.
2.3. Maroochy Wastewater Attack and other Ex-
amples
In 2001, an erstwhile employee of a small town in Aus-
tralia started issuing radio commands (using stolen equip-
ment) to sewage treatment facilities that he had helped in-
stall, using stolen equipment [1,27]. This resulted in a lot of
environmental damage. The attack was hard to track since
the requisite alarms were not being reported to the central
computer and this computer couldn’t communicate with the
pumping stations during the attacks. Initially the incidents
looked like anomalous, unintentional events. It was took a
lot of analysis of the system to understand that there was a
malicious entity operating to cause these problems.
There have been numerous other attacks that infiltrated
critical systems e.g. NRG generation plants [20], canal sys-
tems [18], medical devices [16], etc.
2.4. Discussion
As these examples show, safety-critical systems can no
longer be considered to be safe from security breaches.
While the development of cyber security techniques can
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help alleviate such problems, the real concern is for the con-
trol systems and physical plants that can be seriously dam-
aged – often resulting in the crippling of critical infrastruc-
ture. Hence, we propose non-traditional intrusion detection
and recovery mechanisms to tackle such problems. We use
to our advantage the fact that the control codes running in a
real-time system tend to be deterministic in behavior, sim-
ple to implement and exhibit strict timing properties.
For the rest of this paper, we will show how such in-
trusions can be detected and the harmful effects mitigated
by use of our Secure System Simplex Architecture (S3A).
Hence, our aim is to identify, as quickly as possible, that
an infection has taken place and then ensure that the sys-
tem (and its physical components) are always safe. Note: as
stated in the introduction, our work does not aim to prevent
the original infections since that is a large problem that re-
quires the development and implementation of multiple lev-
els of cyber security techniques/research. We focus on the
aftermath of the infection of control codes.
3. Threat Model
We deliberately will not delve too deeply into specific
threat models, since we believe that our techniques will
work well for a broad class of attacks that modify the ex-
ecution behavior of embedded code in safety-critical sys-
tems. Attacks similar to the ones mentioned in Section 2
can be caught by the mechanisms presented in this paper.
Hence, code could be injected by any of the mechanisms
described in that section – as long as the malicious en-
tity tries to execute any code, we will be able to detect it.
Hence, our threat model [14] is quite broad and can detect
attacks such as: (a) physical attacks, ı.e. code injected via
infected/malicious hardware; (b) memory attacks where at-
tackers try to inject malicious code into the system and/or
take over existing code; (c) insider attacks where the attack-
ers try to gain control of the application/system by altering
all or part of the program at runtime.
We will, instead, focus on what happens after attackers
perform any of the above actions in order to execute their
code. Hence, we intend to show how our architecture is able
to quickly detect this and keep the system(s) safe particu-
larly the physical systems. Since we don’t care much about
what executes and are more concerned with how long some-
thing executes, our “malicious entity” is a little more ab-
stract as explained later in Sections 5.4.4 and 6.2.
4. System Simplex Overview
The Simplex Architecture [25] utilizes the idea of using
simplicity to control complexity in order to safely use an un-
trusted subsystem in a safety-critical control system. A Sim-
plex system, shown in Figure 1, consists of three main com-
ponents:
a. under normal operating conditions the Complex
Controller actuates the plant; this controller has
high performance characteristics and is typically un-
verifiable due to its complexity;
b. if, during this process, the system state becomes in
danger of violating a safety condition, the Safety
Controller takes over;
c. the exact switching behavior is implemented within a
Decision Module.
The advantage of the design is that high-performance com-
ponents can be used without the requirement that they be
fully verified. By maintaining a correct safety controller and
decision module the properties about the safety of the com-
posite system can be guaranteed. Thus, even if the complex
controller is upgraded, is faulty or becomes infected with
malware, we are still assured that the formal safety proper-
ties can never be violated and the plant remains safe. The
Simplex architecture has been used to improve the safety of
a fleet of remote-controlled cars [7], pacemakers [2] as well
as advanced avionics systems [23].
Early Simplex designs had all three subsystems located
in software – at the application-level. To guarantee com-
plete system safety, however, other components such as any
middleware and the operating system need to behave cor-
rectly. This requirement was relaxed in System-Level Sim-
plex [2] by performing hardware/software partitioning on
the system. In System-Level Simplex, the safety controller
and the decision module are moved to a dedicated process-
ing unit (an FPGA) that is different from the the micropro-
cessor running the complex controller. We leverage this par-
titioning technique in S3A.
Untrusted Controller: One important question is the use
of an unverified (and hence, untrusted) complex controller
in such systems. It is not that designers wish to use unveri-
fied controllers in such systems. Most such controllers that
are intended to control anything but the simplest of systems
are typically very complex and hard to verify. This is es-
pecially true if they must also achieve high levels of perfor-
mance. Hence, there could be bugs and/or potential vulnera-
bilities in the system that attackers could exploit. Even if we
assume that the controller is completely trusted, it can still
be compromised (case in point – Stuxnet reprogrammed the
controller in the PLC). Our technique can protect against
any such intrusion, be it in trusted or untrusted controllers.
System Upgrades: Another issue is what happens if the
system must be updated and that process either (a) breaks
the safety and timing properties of the system or (b) intro-
duces malicious code. This is particularly important if such
updates were to happen in a remote fashion. While these
would be serious issues in most general-purpose or even
mobile embedded systems (e.g. cell phones), it is not a prob-
lem for safety-critical systems. As mentioned in Section 1,
such systems are rarely updated, if at all. Also, any updates
have the following properties:
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Figure 1: Simplex Architecture Figure 2: S3A Architecture
i. updates are never performed remotely – they are car-
ried out by trusted engineers;
ii. most updates are minor in that they only tune cer-
tain parameters and rarely, if at all, modify the con-
trol/timing structure of the code – hence they will not
even modify the safety properties of the system and
iii. any major changes will require extensive redesign,
testing, etc. – hence the safety and real-time proper-
ties of the system must then be re-analyzed anyways.
One other important point is that the Simplex architecture
can actually support upgrades to the complex controllers
[24] in a safe manner.
Our application of Simplex in S3A, in this paper, has
several significant differences compared with earlier ap-
proaches. In the past, the primary motivation to use Sim-
plex was to aid in the verification of complex systems. In
this work, we instead apply Simplex to protect against mal-
ware that has infected the complex controller. Another key
difference is that previously the decision module’s behav-
ior was determined completely by the physical state of the
plant. In this work, we widen the scope of the “correct state”
by using side channels from the computational part of the
system, such as the timing properties of executing real-time
tasks, in order to determine when to perform the switch-
ing. The Simplex decision module is now monitoring both,
the physical system as well as the cyber state of the compu-
tational system.
5. Integrated Framework for Security: Se-
cure System Simplex Architecture (S3A)
We now present the Secure System Simplex Architecture
(S3A) that prevents damage from malicious intrusions in
safety-critical systems as well as aids in rapid detection
through side-channel monitoring. In this section, we first
elaborate on the high-level logical framework of the archi-
tecture. We then discuss aspects of the execution time-based
side channels that we have implemented in our S3A proto-
type and then follow it up with details on how to implement
such a system – from the hardware aspects to the OS modi-
fications; from the timing measurements to the control sys-
tem that we use to show the effectiveness of our approach.
5.1. High Level Architecture
Figure 2 provides a high level overview of the system ar-
chitecture. There is a Complex Controller that com-
putes the control logic under normal operations. The com-
puted actuation command is sent to the plant and sensor
readings are produced and given to the controller to enable
feedback control. There is also a Decision Module and
Safety Controller in this architecture that are used
not only to prevent damage to the plant in case of con-
troller code bugs (as with the traditional Simplex appli-
cations) but also to prevent plant damage in the case of
malicious actuation from attackers. We also have a Side
Channel Monitor that examines the execution of the
Complex Controller for changes in ‘expected’ be-
havior (in this paper it monitors the execution time of the
Complex Controller to see if there is any deviation
from what is expected). If the information obtained via the
side channels differs from the expected model(s) of the sys-
tem, the Decision Module is informed and control is
switched to the Safety Controller (and an alarm can
be raised). The types of side channels we can consider in
a CPU-based embedded system include the execution time
profiles of tasks, the number of instructions executed, the
memory footprint and usage pattern or even the external
communication pattern of the task. We will discuss timing
side channels in more detail in the Section 5.2 and elabo-
rate on the viability of the others in Sections 5.3 and 9.
This approach is qualitatively more difficult to attack
than a typical control system. An attacker not only has to
compromise the main system, but she also has to replicate
all the side channels that are currently being monitored. If
the timing of the task execution is being monitored then
the attacker must replicate the timing profile of a correctly-
functioning system. If the cycle count is being observed, her
attack must also be sure to execute for a believable number
of instructions. Even if all the side channels match the ex-
pected models, the Decision Module will still monitor the
plant state and, when malicious actuation occurs, prevent
system damage.
The effectiveness of the side channel early-detection
methodology depends on two factors. First, the constructed
model of each side channel should restrict valid system be-
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havior (not easily replicable). Second, the side channel it-
self must be secure (not easily forgeable). These factors are
implementation specific and will be discussed later in Sec-
tion 5.4.
5.2. Timing Side Channels
In this paper, we intend to secure a real-time embedded
system. Therefore, we assume that the system has typical
real-time characteristics, i.e. the system is divided into a set
of periodic tasks managed by a real-time scheduler. Each
task has a known execution time and each task periodically
activates a job.
The monitoring module maintains a real-time timing
model of the system. Violations of this timing model oc-
cur when the,
i. job execution time is too large;
ii. job execution time is too small;
iii. job activation period is too large; or
iv. job activation period is too small.
Additionally, the monitoring module needs to examine the
execution of the idle task. This prevents a malicious at-
tacker from allowing the real-time task to execute normally
and perform malicious activity during idle time. Finally, the
monitoring module should be cognizant of the system ac-
tivities that may result in timing perturbations.
In our prototype, we address two of these timing side
channel requirements: monitoring the control task and the
idle task. For rapid prototype development, we eliminate
system noise (disable interrupts) while our control task is
running to obtain a predictable timing environment3 rather
than patching system interrupts in order to receive their tim-
ing information. In a real-time system the interrupts would
be predictable and scheduled deterministically – hence we
would be able to monitor them as well as other tasks. This
addition, however, could be made to our prototype in the fu-
ture.
Execution times of the various real-time tasks in such
systems are anyways obtained as part of system design by
a variety of methods [32]. There is no extra effort that we
have to perform to obtain this information. The worst-case,
best-case and average-case behavior for most real-time sys-
tems is calculated ahead of time to ensure that all resource
and schedulability requirements will be met during system
operation. We use this knowledge of execution profiles to
our advantage in S3A.
5.3. Other Potential Time-based Side Channels
In the assumed context of predictable real-time embed-
ded control systems, several other side channels are avail-
able as part of the cyber state. These include the task activa-
tion periodicity, memory footprint, bus access times and du-
3 Details in Section 5.4.5.
rations, scheduler events, etc.. Each of these is a candidate
for benevolent side-channels that can be monitored to de-
tect infections and would have to be individually detected
and replicated by an attacker to maintain control in an in-
fected system, thus qualitatively increasing the difficulty for
future attackers.
Additionally, the specific side channels used may vary
depending on the type of system. E.g., in this paper, we
focus on CPU-based real-time control systems. Other sys-
tems, e.g. PLC-based systems, would likely need to either
monitor the side channels using different mechanisms or
utilize a completely different (or additional) sets of side
channels.
5.4. Implementation
We now describe a prototype implementation of S3A
that we have created. The technical details of the prototype
are listed in Table 1. We will elaborate on key aspects of
our implementation in detail in the upcoming subsections.
First, a hardware component overview is provided in Sec-
tion 5.4.1. Then, the inverted pendulum hardware (our ex-
ample ‘safety-critical control system’) setup is described in
Section 5.4.2. The methodology for timing measurements
of the control code is described in Section 5.4.3 and the
methodology for timing-variability (‘malicious code’) tests
is presented in Section 5.4.4. Section 5.4.5 gives essential
details about the operating system setup during the mea-
surements. Finally, Section 5.4.6 describes the specific de-
sign of the Decision Module and the timing Side
Channel Monitor.
Component Details
Inverted Pendulum Quanser IP01
FPGA Xilinx ML505
Computer with Controller Intel Quad core 2.6 GHz
Operating System Linux kernel ver. 2.6.36
Timing Profile Intel Timestamp
Counter (rdtsc)
Table 1: S3A Prototype Implementation Details
Figure 3: S3A Implementation Overview
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5.4.1. Hardware Components A high-level hardware de-
sign of our prototype is shown in Figure 3. The proto-
type hardware instantiates the logical Secure System Sim-
plex architecture previously described in Section 5 and
shown in Figure 2. In our implementation, we run the
Complex Controller on the main CPU. The Complex
Controller communicates with a trusted hardware compo-
nent, an FPGA in this case, to perform control of an inverted
pendulum. Sensor readings are obtained by the FPGA over
the PCIe bus using memory mapped I/O. The actuation
command, in turn, is written to the memory-mapped re-
gion on the FPGA. Additionally, timing messages in the
form of memory-mapped writes are periodically sent to the
FPGA based on the state of execution (at the start/end of
the control task and periodically during the Idle Task).
This creates a timing side channel that can be observed by a
Timing Channel Monitor running on the FPGA. On
the FPGA side, the Timing Channel Monitor will
measure the time elapsed between timing messages from
the Complex Controller to ensure that the execution
conforms to an expected timing model. The Decision
Modulewill periodically examine the output of the Timing
Channel Monitor, the actuation command from sent by the
Complex Controller from Shared Memory on the FPGA,
the actuation command from the locally-running Safety
Controller and the state of the plant from a Sensor
and Actuator Interface and decide which con-
troller’s actuation command should be used – the complex
one on the CPU or the safe one on the FPGA. The actuation
command is then output back to the Sensor and Actuator In-
terface. The interface then, through a digital-to-analog con-
verter, actuates the Plant – in our case, an inverted pen-
dulum. The Sensor and Actuator Interface also periodically
acquires sensor readings through analog-to-digital convert-
ers and write their values to both shared memory accessi-
ble by the Complex Controller and to memory accessible
by the trusted Decision Module and Safety Controller.
5.4.2. Inverted Pendulum We used an inverted pendulum
(IP) as the plant that was being controlled. An inverted pen-
dulum, like the one shown in Figure 4, is a classic real-time
control challenge where a rod must be maintained in an up-
right position by moving a cart attached to the bottom of
the pendulum along a one-dimensional track. There are two
sensors to measure both the current pendulum angle as well
as the cart position on the track and there is one actuator
(the motor near the base of the pendulum) used to move
the cart. Two safety invariants must be met: (1) the pendu-
lum must remain upright (can not fall over) and (2) the cart
must remain near the center of the track. The specific in-
verted pendulum we used in our testbed was based on the
Quanser IP01 linear control challenge [11].
Our setup varies slightly from an off-the-shelf version of
the Quanser IP01. The most important difference is that we
Figure 4: An inverted pendulum control system maintains
an upright rod along a one-dimensional track.
needed to directly connect the sensors and actuators to the
FPGA hardware while the prebuilt setup requires a com-
puter to do the data acquisition. We modified the system
to redirect the sensor values and motor commands through
an Arduino Uno microcontroller that communicates directly
with the S3A FPGA through a serial cable. Although this
change can potentially introduce latency into the system,
we did not observe any issues with safely actuating the pen-
dulum due to this small delay. The control code that man-
ages the IP executes on a computer (Section 5.4.5 and Table
1). This control code executes at a frequency of 50 Hz.
Note: The inverted pendulum has been used quite exten-
sively in literature to be an appropriate example of a real-
time control system [2, 25]. Hence we believe it would suf-
fice to show an early prototype of our solutions. We are cur-
rently working on applying these techniques to other real
control systems in conjunction with power vendors.
5.4.3. Timing The implementation of the complex con-
troller for the inverted pendulum is fairly simple with very
few branches and most loops being statically decidable4.
Hence it is fairly easy to calculate the execution time and
number of instructions taken for such code. In our frame-
work, we utilized simple dynamic timing analysis [32]
methods to obtain an execution profile of the code. We
used the Intel time stamp counter (rdtsc) [12] to obtain
high resolution execution time measurements for the con-
trol code.
The profile consisted of the ‘worst-case,’ ‘best-case’ and
‘steady-case’ numbers for the control code that was ob-
tained by executing it multiple times on the actual computer
where it would execute and measuring each set of execu-
tions. ‘Steady-case’ refers to the values obtained when the
execution time has stabilized over multiple, repeated execu-
4 This is typical of most control code in safety-critical and real-time con-
trol systems – hence our implementation of the controller for the in-
verted pendulum is also similar.
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tions – i.e. when the initial cold cache related timing dila-
tion at the start of the experiments no longer occur.
The control code was placed in a separate function and
called in a loop. As part of our experiments, the loop was ex-
ecuted 1, 10, 100, 1, 000, 10, 000, 100, 000 and 1, 000, 000
times. During each of these scenarios, the total time of the
loop as well as the times taken up during each individual
iteration was measured. From these traces we were able
to determine the maximum (worst-case), minimum (best-
case) and steady-case values for the execution time of the
controller code. To reduce the noise from instrumentation
and overheads of the loops, function calls, etc. we used
the ‘dual-loop timing’ method: i.e., empty loops with only
the measurement instrumentation were timed as a ’con-
trol’ experiment. The execution times obtained for these
instrumentation-only loops were subtracted from the exe-
cution times for the loops with the control code.
Interrupts (all interrupts including inter-processor inter-
rupts) were disabled during the timing measurements. To
reduce the timing effects of the operating system and other
system issues we isolated our controller as best as we could
as we will describe in Section 5.4.5.
While we used simple measurement-based schemes for
obtaining the execution profile for the control code in this
paper, it does not preclude the use of other more sophisti-
cated analysis techniques [19,32] to obtain better (and safer)
timing estimates. This is especially true if the code is more
complex than the one used for the inverted pendulum. In
fact, the better the estimation methods, the better S3A will
be able to detect anomalies and intrusions.
5.4.4. Execution Time Variation To mimic the effect of
code modification on timing, we insert extra code into the
execution of the control loop function described in Section
5.4.3. Specifically, the extra code is a loop with a varying
upper bound (i.e. 1, 10, 100) that performs multiple arith-
metic operations (floating point and integer). The idea be-
ing that the extra time/instructions that execute will make
it look like an intrusion has taken place. Our S3A system
will then detect the additional execution, raise an alarm and
transfer control to the simple controller on the FPGA.
Note: As mentioned before, we are less interested in
what kind of code executes “maliciously” because our de-
tection scheme does not depend on this detail. We only need
to check whether whatever is executing has modified the
timing profile of the system.
5.4.5. System and OS Setup As stated in Table 1, we
used an off-the-shelf multi-core platform running Linux
kernel 2.6.36 for our experiments. Since we use a COTS
system there are many potential sources of timing noise
such as cache interference, interrupts, kernel threads and
other processes that must be removed for our measurements
to be meaningful. In this section we describe the configura-
tion we used to best emulate a typical uni-processor embed-
ded real-time platform.
The CPU we used is an Intel Q6700 chip that has four
cores and each pair of cores shares a common level two
(last level) cache. We divided the four cores into two parti-
tions:
1. the system partition running on the first pair of cores
(sharing one of the two L2 caches) handles all inter-
rupts for non-critical devices (e.g., the keyboard) and
runs all the operating system activities and non real-
time processes (e.g., the shell we use to run the exper-
iments);
2. the real-time partition runs on the second pair of cores
(sharing the second L2 cache). One core in the real-
time partition runs our real-time tasks together with the
driver for the trusted FPGA component; the other core
is turned off so that we avoid any L2 cache interfer-
ence among these two cores.
5.4.6. Detection In our implementation, detection of ma-
licious code can occur in one of two ways. The decision
module observes both (i) the physical state of the plant (by
traditional Simplex) as well as (ii) the computation state of
the system (based on timing messages; S3A). A violation
of the physical model or the computational model can trig-
ger the decision module to switch control to the safety con-
troller on the FPGA. The physical model is monitored as
described in previous work [3,4,25]. Based on a function of
the track position and pendulum angle, the decision mod-
ule may choose to switch over to the safety controller.
The computational system is also monitored for viola-
tions of the expected timing model of the system. Both the
control task and the idle task are monitored in order to pe-
riodically send timing messages to the FPGA. The FPGA
contains an expected timing model of the system that is a fi-
nite state machine (FSM) running in hardware. When tim-
ing messages arrive, or timers expire, the finite state ma-
chine state can advance. If malicious code were to execute,
it would have a limited window of time to replicate the tim-
Figure 5: FSM for Detecting Timing Model Violations
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ing side channel before it was detected by the Simplex mod-
ule.
Generally speaking, monitoring the timing of a real-time
system can be performed by maintaining state about each
task in the system. Each task would have a two timers:
I. the first would enforce the execution time of the task
II. the other will monitor periodic activation of the task
Furthermore, a stack would be used to track task preemp-
tions. Since typical real-time systems use priority-based ex-
ecution, all task switches will be directly observable by the
FPGA through task start/task end messages.
For our specific prototype, we implemented, in hard-
ware, the finite state machine on an FPGA as shown in Fig-
ure 5. In our system there are two tasks: (i) the idle task and
(ii) the controller task. Since only a single task may be pre-
empted (the idle task), we maintain a single variable as the
call stack, stateI . Three timers are present: clkC and clkP
maintain the execution time and period of the control task,
clkI maintains the execution of the idle task. In the figure,
clkC ticks while the control task is running (states C1 and
C2) and clkI ticks while the idle task is executing (states
I1 and I2). ClkP always ticks. The finite state machine
is parameterized with six values: MustWaitC , CanWaitC ,
MustWaitI , CanWaitI , MustWaitP , and CanWaitP . These
values are determined by the minimum and maximum time
permitted between timing messages. The MustWait time in-
dicates the minimum time that must elapse, whereas the
CanTime indicates the jitter permitted between different it-
erations of the loop. To say it another way, MustWait is
the minimum execution time of the task/idle loop/period,
whereas (MustWait + CanTime) is the maximum execution
time.
In the finite state machine, initially the control task
is running. State C1 is entered until clkC ticks from
MustWaitC to 0. Then state C2 is entered. If clkC ticks from
CanWaitC to 0 without the end task message, the control
task has executed for too long and a timing violation oc-
curs (indicated by the dotted arrow in state C2). Once the
end control task message is received, the idle task begins to
execute. Under normal operation, the state will change be-
tween I1 and I2 several times, until the control task is reac-
tivated and state C1 is again entered. Any messages that ar-
rive without explicit transitions in the timing FSM are inter-
preted as errors in the prototype and trigger decision mod-
ule to switch to the safety controller. Additionally, the dot-
ted transitions in the FSM are timing violations that also
trigger the decision module to take corrective action.
The FSM can also be used to tightly track the execution
behavior of the code for more sophisticated controllers, e.g.
if the control code has many branches, function calls, etc.
For instance, when the control code reaches a branch that af-
fects the overall execution time, a message can be sent to the
FSM about which side of the branch was taken. The FSM
can now use this information to accurately track the execu-
tion of the program for all control constructs in the code.
6. Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the Secure System Simplex
architecture – first the we present timing results that we ob-
tained by analysis of the controller code (Sections 6.1 and
6.2) – these values are used to form the profile of the execu-
tion behavior that is then used in intrusion detection mech-
anism on the FPGA. We then present the details of the in-
trusion detection in Section 6.3.
6.1. Timing Results and Execution Profile
Figure 6: Summary of the Timing Results
Figure 6 shows a high level summary of the timing ex-
periments used to obtain the execution profile of the com-
plex controller code that executes on the computer (Fig-
ure 2). We used dynamic timing analysis techniques to ob-
tain the worst, best and steady state execution times for this
code. The x-axis represents the number of times the con-
troller code was repeatedly executed: from 1 to 1, 000, 000
in steps of 10. The y-axis represents the execution time in
cycles. Each grouping of vertical lines represents the ‘worst-
case’, ‘steady-state’ and ‘best-case’ execution times for that
experiment. ‘Steady-state’ refers to the execution time when
successive executions of the controller code resulted in the
same execution time – i.e. the situation when the execution
reached a steady state. This is compared to the first few it-
erations, when cache and other hardware effects would re-
sult in a higher variance in the execution time of the code
– the ‘worst-case’ numbers in the graph are usually from
these first few iterations before the system effects (in par-
ticular the cache) have settled down. This is the reason why
there exists a slightly larger difference between the worst-
case and best-case numbers.
Each vertical bar is split into two parts – the lower part
shows the instrumentation overhead for that experiment5,
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while the top is the part that represents the pure timing for
the control code only. We also see that the instrumentation
overhead is almost the same across all experiments – oscil-
lating between 260 and 270 cycles for all experiments.
As seen in the graph, the steady state and best-case val-
ues are very close, not just within the same experiment, but
across experiments. The largest difference between the two
is 360 cycles for the n = 100, 000 experiment. This just
shows that our assumption that controller codes in safety-
critical systems are simple and have little variability is valid.
This lack of variability is also evident from the fact that
the worst-case execution cycles, across experiments, do not
show much variance. The worst-case values for the last ex-
periment (1, 000, 000) has a slightly higher value of 16, 560
and this can be chalked down to the initial cold cache and
other system effects.
Figure 7 shows the execution profile for one timing ex-
periment in particular – that of 100, 000 iterations. The x-
axis is the iteration number while the y-axis is the num-
ber of cycles for each iteration. As this figure shows, the
first few iterations take a little longer (around 17K cycles)
and then most of the execution stabilizes to within a nar-
row band of:
1, 590 cycles = 14, 660− 13, 070
i.e. ∼ 0.6 µs at 2.67 GHz
Hence, this band will define the ‘accepted range’ of values
that the FPGA will use to check for intrusions. Any execu-
tion that changes the steady state execution time by more
than this narrow range will be caught by the FPGA. In fact,
the FPGA will catch variance in either direction – i.e. an in-
crease as well as a decrease in execution time.
The graph also shows that while the majority of execu-
tion times fall within a small band at the lower end of the
above mentioned range, some values also fall into a narrow
5 As explained in Section 5.4.3, we used dual-loop timing techniques to
obtain the overheads due to the instrumentation.
Figure 7: Execution Profile for 100,000 iterations
band at the top of the range (i.e. around the 14K value). This
narrow band of increased execution times for some experi-
ments is due to latent system effects that we were not able to
remove. The main culprit is the last level cache that, in this
architecture, uses a random replacement policy. Hence, ev-
ery once in a while a few of our controller’s cache lines are
evicted by periodic kernel threads that we could not eas-
ily disable (since we are running a COTS operating system)
and these iterations take a few hundred cycles extra (any-
where from 500− 900) to execute. With a more predictable
cache replacement policy, like the ones used in hard real-
time systems, we would not see this behavior. To prove this
theory we ran the same measurements on a PowerPC that
uses psuedo-LRU (Last Recently Used) cache replacement
policy in its last level and all the points are clustered into a
single band. In fact, with LRU, tasks would not evict each
other cache’s lines, unless the cache is not big enough to fit
them at the same time6
Figure 7 also shows a few sporadic experiments exhibit-
ing much higher execution times. Again, this is due to sys-
tem effects, and in particular, contention on the bus when
communicating with the FPGA. As explained in Section
5.4.1, the complex controller reads and writes messages to
and from the FPGA to control the pendulum and to send
the timing messages. Many a time, while the complex con-
troller is waiting for data from the inverted pendulum (an-
gle and track position) that arrives on the common bus, the
incoming messages experience unpredictable delays. These
delays are due to bus contention among the FPGA and other
peripherals sharing the same bus.
To prove that the communication with the FPGA was
the cause of these effects, we conducted timing experiments
where the FPGA was switched off and all calls to communi-
cate with it (read/write) resulted in null function calls. Fig-
ure 8 shows the results of these experiments for the 100, 000
6 If this is the case, we just have to account for it, when we compute the
execution time for each task.
Figure 8: Execution Profile (100,0000) without FPGA
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iterations point. This experiment highlights two important
points:
• the random spikes at higher values no longer exist, thus
showing that the bus contention due to communication
with the FPGA was the main cause of the spikes
• the same ‘double-band’ of execution results also ap-
pears here; the interesting fact is that the gap between
the bands is almost exactly identical to that of Figure 7,
thus providing more evidence to the fact that the cache
(and its replacement policy) is the culprit.
Such issues could be avoided in an actual hard real-time
system instead of the COTS-based experimental setup that
we use here. In fact, a hard real-time system would use a
more predictable bus, or other techniques [5], that allows
designers to bound I/O contention and avoid random spikes.
6.2. Malicious code Execution Results
Figure 9: Execution Cycles for Malicious Code execution
We introduce “malicious code” by inserting extra in-
structions (Section 5.4.4) – i.e. a loop of variable size within
the complex controller code. The upper bounds for the ma-
licious loop are one of 1, 10, 100 – we stopped at the upper
limit of 100 since anything over this value would put the ex-
ecution of the “infected” control code over the real-time pe-
riod of the task. Also, as we will see soon, even these small
additional increases in execution times will be caught by the
monitoring framework of S3A.
Figure 9 shows the execution time (in cycles on the y-
axis) taken up by the code for value of the malicious loop
values (x-axis). The final bar in the graph represents the
“base,” i.e. the number of execution cycles taken up by the
controller code without any malicious loop. As expected,
the values for the malicious code increases significantly
with each increase in the loop bound. Even the smallest sign
of the presence of the malicious loop puts it outside of the
narrow range (0.6µs) explained in Section 6.1. Hence, even
this will be caught by S3A and control will be transferred
over to the simple controller executing on the FPGA. Note:
Since we don’t really care what executes as part of mali-
cious code and intend to only catch variations in execution
time, we only mimic the increased execution time effects by
the methods discussed in this section.
6.3. Intrusion Detection
In this section, we describe the evaluation of our tim-
ing side channel intrusion detection technique. First, we de-
scribe measurements of the timing of key aspects of our
overall architecture. Then, we demonstrate the early detec-
tion of malicious code execution using the timing side chan-
nel approach compared with monitoring the plant state only
(say, by used of traditional Simplex). The results of our in-
trusion detection measurements are summarized in Table 2.
Our first timing measurement was to check the overhead
of sending timing messages to the FPGA. Although the mes-
sage itself takes time to propagate through the PCIe bus to
the FPGA, the CPU is not stalled during this time. By us-
ing the time stamp counter we measured the overhead on the
CPU for sending a single timing message to be 130 cycles
(50 nanoseconds). This time is extremely small and there-
fore each process could realistically send multiple messages
during a single iteration of each control loop to reduce the
time an attacker has to replicate the timing side channel. An-
other advantage of having multiple timing messages per it-
eration is that if the program contains branches, we could
communicate to the FPGA timing monitor (at run-time) in-
formation about which branch was taken thus allowing for
tighter monitoring of the timing requirements in the timing
model FSM.
The second timing measurement we did was to quan-
tify the jitter of the timing messages through the intercon-
nect going to the FPGA. We performed this measurement by
recording the difference between the arrival of the start con-
trol iteration timing message and the end control iteration
timing message, in the FPGA, over several thousand itera-
tions of the control loop. The reason for this jitter is twofold:
(a) one source is the jitter of the execution time itself (the
difference between the minimum and maximum execution
time as shown in Figure 5) and (b) the second source of jit-
ter is the varying time of message propagation through the
PCIe bus.
Since our testbed was a multicore system, processes run-
ning concurrently on other cores as well as other indepen-
dent bus masters such as peripherals may cause interfer-
ence on the shared interconnect. Although, as we already
said, in a deployed real-time control system, such noise
would not be present or at least bounded. On the other hand,
our testbed was essentially an off-the-shelf installation of
Linux running on COTS hardware. Nonetheless, we mea-
sured the typical timing variation caused by the intercon-
nect to be about 0.6 microseconds, or less than one eighth
of the iteration time of a single control iteration in this case.
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Measured Quantity Time (µs)
Control Task Execution Time 4.8 - 5.4
for single iteration
Interconnect Extra Jitter ∼ 0.6
Enforced Iteration Time 4.6 - 5.7
Timing Anomaly Detection Time 5.7
(for Inverted Pendulum system)
Vanilla Simplex Anomaly Detection Time 10,000
Timing Message CPU Overhead 0.05
Table 2: Measured Timings during Intrusion Detection
Any malicious code that increases the execution time of the
task by more than this amount would be detected by the
FPGA timing monitor. As shown in Table 2, we can now de-
tect an intrusion using the timing-based side channel within
5.7µs and anything that changes the timing by 0.6µs would
be caught. Furthermore, we could also add multiple timing
messages in each control iteration (since the CPU message
overhead is so low) to further reduce the maximum intru-
sion detection delay.
In Table 2, the control task execution time was ob-
tained from from the execution time measurements from
Section 6.1. The values in the table are in absolute time
which was converted from the cycle count measurements
we performed. Hence, the 4.6 − 5.7µs value for the ‘Con-
trol Task Execution Time’ is obtained from the (approx.)
13, 000 − 14, 000 cycles that we discussed in Section 6.1
and Figure 7.
Due to the extra jitter caused by the interconnect, the en-
forced iteration time is expectedly larger than the measured
control task execution time. The maximum enforced iter-
ation time, 5.7µs, is the maximum time the experimental
framework can proceed without a timing message before
the safety controller takes over. To state it another way, in
the FSM in Figure 5, the runtime value of MustWaitC
is 4.6µs, and the runtime value of CanWaitC is about
1.1µs (mustWaitI and canWaitI are much lower). Given
those numbers, the side-channel monitor FSM will detect a
missed timing message within 5.7µs, i.e. the detection time
reported.
We now compare the early detection of malicious code
through timing side channels with the behavior of the de-
cision module of the S3A with the situation when it only
monitors the plant state (vanilla Simplex). In the timing side
channel version, as discussed above, the maximum time that
can proceed before without valid timing messages is 5.7µs.
For the vanilla Simplex version, we experimentally mea-
sured the amount of time needed to detect an intrusion. Af-
ter taking control of the system, we immediately tried to
destabilize the pendulum by sending a maximum voltage
value in the direction which would most quickly collapse
the pendulum (in order to see a lower bound on the detec-
tion time when plant state is monitored alone). In this ex-
periment, we were able to detect an intrusion after 5 con-
trol iterations, or 100 milliseconds. It is clear that the use
of timing side channels enables significantly faster detec-
tion of security vulnerabilities in real-time control systems:
over four orders of magnitude faster than with traditional
Simplex.
7. Limitations
The proposed S3A Architecture is not a silver bullet for
intrusion detection in embedded control systems and does
have some practical restrictions which may limit its appli-
cability. Firstly, in order to use the Secure System Simplex
Architecture in a real system, the system needs to be de-
signed with the architecture in mind. If there is no way to in-
sert a decision module between the controller and the plant
then the architecture can not be used. While this is a limita-
tion for some existing systems, we think that the design of
future systems could provision for such techniques; after all
it is never a bad idea to consider security aspects when de-
signing a new system.
One concern regarding the correctness of the approach is
making sure that an attacker cannot easily replicate our side
channels. E.g., if a processor instruction count side channel
is created by naively sending the current instruction count
value to the the Monitoring Module then a malicious
entity could easily store and then replay these values. These
types of restrictions could be overcome with minor modifi-
cations to the processor architecture. In this instance, allow-
ing the FPGA to directly access the instruction count with-
out involving explicit communication from the CPU would
eliminate the possibility of spoofing.
Additionally, for each side channel, a model of the cor-
rect behavior must be created that would restrict a mali-
cious program. For our timing side channel, one problem
could be that the execution of the task has too much of
a difference between the minimum and maximum execu-
tion times to provide real restrictions on system behavior.
While this could be the case in general purpose systems, it
is not very likely in CPS with real-time constraints. Even so,
this could be overcome at runtime by having each timing-
behavior-modifying branch point send a timing message to
the FPGA indicating what path was taken. This would per-
mit an extremely tight bound to be placed on the execu-
tion time at the expense of a more complicated state ma-
chine to detect timing anomalies. The construction and tun-
ing of the timing parameters of the state machine is also
currently a manual process. We believe this could eventu-
ally become a more automatic step in the procedure by per-
forming a compile-time analysis of the control flow graph
of the code – indicating where to send the timing messages
and using run-time analysis to perform precise timing mea-
surements.
The implementation of the trusted FPGA hardware in our
framework must be correct for the system to be secure. This
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may seem like we have just moved the problem over to se-
curing the FPGA system instead of the main system, but this
is not exactly the same for the following reason: the FPGA
and Safety Controller only need to maintain the safety of
the plant. The Complex Controller, on the other hand, can
perform useful work with the plant so any upgrades will
be made to the Complex Controller and not to the FPGA’s
safety logic. The Complex Controller’s timing profile would
need to be upgraded but that could be done in a restricted
way to prevent modification to the Safety Controller and
Decision Module. Of course, we should not permit FPGA
reconfiguration at runtime and the trusted hardware plat-
form could even be created on an Application-Specific In-
tegrated Circuit (ASIC) instead of an FPGA in order to en-
force this.
One issue related to the use of FPGAs in such systems
is that sometimes the complex controller might require the
use of complex floating point calculations and such floating-
point computation units are typically not present on FPGAs
since they use up significant area. The FPGA in our archi-
tecture is used as a rapid prototype of the trusted simplex
component. A deployment implementation would likely use
a trusted microcontroller along with any capabilities (float-
ing point unit) that are needed for the safety controller, deci-
sion module, and side-channel monitor. Also, as mentioned
before, the FPGA will only host the safety controller that
maintains bare functionality. Hence, it is unlikely that it will
need to perform fancy floating point calculations.
Finally, the original Simplex, in general, can only protect
the systems from properties known up front to result in un-
safe states. E.g. in Stuxnet, the malicious controller would
actuate the plant motor for periods at very high frequencies
and then for periods at very low frequencies in order to dam-
age the motors. If the Decision Module was not mon-
itoring this property, such unsafe actuation would still pro-
ceed to the plant.
8. Related Work
The closest work to S3A is by Zimmer et. al. [34]. They
use worst-case execution time (WCET) information to de-
tect intrusions in hard real-time systems by instrumenting
the tasks and schedulers and periodically checking whether
the execution has gone past the expected WCET values.
Our work is more focused on detecting intrusions in real-
time control systems and ensuring that the plant remains
safe even if the intruder is able to bypass all the detec-
tion/security mechanisms. Also, in our work, the system
remains safe even if the intruder gains root privileges to
the system – the work by Zimmer et. al. cannot withstand
this level of intrusion since an attacker with root privileges
can bypass all the checking mechanisms. Also, our check-
ing/monitoring is performed by a trusted hardware compo-
nent that is separate from the main system thus increasing
the overall robustness of the architecture.
The trusted computing engine (TCE) [13] as well as the
reliability and security engine (RSE) [14] also use secure
co-processors to execute security-critical code and to mon-
itor the access of critical data. During setup the security-
critical application is loaded on the TCE and then access
to it is monitored during runtime. To detect other secu-
rity violations, compile-time analysis is performed to de-
termine the critical data, the dataflow and what parts of
the code are allowed to access this data. At runtime, RSE
monitors all of this information to see if unauthorized in-
structions/programs access this critical data. While these
techniques could be combined with S3A (since they are
more about intrusion prevention), we don’t need to know
the information about what data is critical or even touch the
source code. We detect intrusions by observing the innate
characteristics of the program at runtime.
The IBM 4758 secure co-processor could also be used
to perform intrusion detection [33]. This work contains a
CPU, separate memory (volatile and non-volatile) along
with cryptographic accelerators and comes wrapped in a
tamper-responding secure boundary. The main methods em-
ployed for intrusion detection included checking the system
for invariants (one example was that a normal user’s ‘uid’
should never change to root) and detecting related viola-
tions. Also, they used it to execute the virus checking pro-
grams since it couldn’t be tampered with. While we could
adapt this processor for use with our architecture, the main
difference from S3A lies in the fact that we employ the in-
herent characteristics of the program to detect intrusions, es-
pecially in the CPS domain; also coupling with the System
Simplex mechanism increases the robustness of the over-
all system.
FlexCore [8] uses a reconfigurable fabric to implement
monitoring and book-keeping functions. It can be used to
implement bookkeeping mechanisms and specific security
methods such as array bounds checking, uninitialized mem-
ory checks, dynamic information flow tracking, etc. in the
reconfigurable hardware. While many of these functionali-
ties could be implemented in S3A, the main difference with
FlexCore lies in the fact that we (a) don’t need to know what
types of attacks are taking place (as long as it modified the
execution time behavior of our code) and (b) don’t need to
analyze the program structure/data as will be the case with
FlexCore.
Pioneer [22] uses sophisticated checksum code and its
execution time information to establish safe remote execu-
tion on an untrusted computer. The checksum code is care-
fully designed so that any malicious modification will result
in increased execution time that will be detected by the re-
questing computer. While their goal is remotely executing
arbitrary code safely on untrusted computers, our goal is to
detect the behavioral changes of known code running on po-
tentially compromised computers.
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TVA [10] provides guarantees that the software running
on the computer is safe in conjunction with a hardware
trusted component (TPM). While they also use trusted hard-
ware, our approach differs in that we’re not trying to prevent
intrusions or attacks. Our aim is to detect these quickly and
maintain the physical safety of the plant.
Other related work is the use of PRET (precision timed
machines) to detect and protect against side-channel at-
tacks [17]. While their work is focused on preventing at-
tacks based on side-channels we use them for a benevolent
purpose – to improve the overall security of the system.
9. Conclusions and Future work
In this paper we presented a new framework named Se-
cure System Simplex Architecture (S3A) that enhances the
security and safety of a real-time control system such as
a SCADA plant. We use a combination of trusted hard-
ware, benevolent side-channels, OS techniques and the in-
trinsic real-time nature (and domain-specific characteris-
tics) of such systems to detect intrusions and prevent the
physical plant from being damaged. We were able to de-
tect intrusions in the system in less than 6 µs and changes
of less than 0.6 µs – time scales that are extremely hard for
an intruders to defeat. This paper also shows that even if
an attacker is able to bypass all security/intrusion detection
techniques, the actual plant will remain safe. Another im-
portant characteristic of these techniques is that there are no
modifications required in the source code. We believe that
the novel techniques and architecture presented in this pa-
per will significantly increase the difficulty faced by would-
be attackers thus improving the security and overall safety
of such systems.
The intrusion detection capabilities of S3A can be fur-
ther enhanced by monitoring multiple side channels and/or
improving the predictability of the system. E.g., with the
current implementation, the more the system is predictable,
the less will be the jitter measured by the timing analysis,
the tighter can be the execution time range enforced by the
Secure Simplex.
For future work we plan to investigate other side chan-
nels. For instance, instruction count can be used in S3A so
that a deviation in the number of instructions can be treated
as an indication of the existence of malicious code. Fairly
small modifications in the processor could enable trusted
hardware to access the CPU instruction counter, thus en-
abling an instruction-based side channel. Finally, a pre-
dictable execution model like PREM [21], can also consid-
erably enhance system predictability and hence, the preci-
sion of timing side channel. In fact, PREM can almost elim-
inate the jitter in execution time jitter that results from bus
and memory contentions.
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